UAS/UAV Implementation at The Platoon Level

A paper that I submitted to Fort Rucker/Redstone Arsenal. The UAV support is not what it should be at our level in the Infantry. They're working on it....I think.

UAS Implementation at the Platoon Level

I greatly appreciate the work that every single individual has put into the UAS programs for our military. But, there is an issue with the implementation of UAS platforms. It’s almost non-existent at the platoon level. While deployed, most of the time the UAS systems were tasked out to other units in sector. There were simply not enough aircraft to go around which meant we had no eyes on possible IEDs or insurgent activity.

At minimum, my goal is to facilitate any effort to get rotorcraft UAS with simplified rotor systems or any user friendly UAS platform down to the Infantry platoons and other combat units. For the most part, this has been a personal endeavor. I’m attempting to expand the “view” with regard to UAS implementation in an effort to refine how UAS aircraft are utilized. If the Armed Services and those in the industry will pause and take a look at the “conceptual picture” with regard to implementation of UAS assets, I’m certain that the methods of implementation can be improved upon. Feedback has always been a critical part of fielding new equipment as well as the application of new tactics and forms of training. The issue is getting the feedback from the right source. With respect to all of our Senior Officers, Warrant Officers, and Non-Commissioned Officers, I do not believe that the above mentioned individuals should be the sole source of feedback. Contractors already make trips to forward areas of operations and it would be good to get them down at least to the FOB level and gather feedback from the Soldiers coming back into the wire from a patrol. To date, I have attempted to test the platform that is outlined in my patent, but it was intended for civil purposes and sport aviation. I will continue to refine the design, but as I’ve stated before, I do not think that my platform is the answer. A year of reviewing and dwelling on the subject has resulted in my trouble-shooting three more additional UAS concepts that are geared toward the Infantry platoon. UAS systems need to be simplified enough that the lowest ranking Soldier can be taught the correct operation and implementation of the system. I’m acting as a result from my experiences as an Infantryman and the lack of adequate platoon level UAS support that existed during my tenure in theater. I have 15 years in active duty Army service. I have been deployed to Iraq twice as an Infantryman. While conducting combat patrols, I very much appreciated the use of helicopter and UAS air support. The Army has already attempted to field Platoon level UAS aircraft, yet most platoons still operate without internal UAS for a number of reasons. Some of the platforms are still in testing. Further, there are Commanders on the line with concerns about losing a UAS system that was intended to be a “throw away” platform. It even gets to a point where the system is never utilized even though the systems are present within unit inventories. As a Platoon Sergeant, this situation developed during my second deployment. I had two Soldiers that were Raven trained and certified in my platoon, but we were never allowed to sign for a Raven. Some negative feedback at our level has surfaced about the Raven. Issues with the Raven UAS systems frequently crashing were of concern and then ground elements were sent to find the UAS system. In modern fields of combat where the environment is mostly urban, rotorcraft UAS are most suited for the Platoon and Squad. Exposed rotor, ducted, or semi-enclosed; it does not matter. Having “eyes” that can loiter above the heads of Soldiers is vital and most important. Control of such a UAS by the Soldiers on the ground would be a force multiplier. During my second deployment, there was one incident when our unit had an insurgent responsible for a grenade attack contained within a radius of a few city blocks. We had fixed wing UAS orbiting and the operator had reported that he had eyes on the insurgent on the roof top of a building within our cordon. The UAS operator was stationed on the FOB (Forward Operating Base) and at one point became distracted and lost visual contact with the insurgent. No clear reason for the loss in contact could be given. The operator could not even tell us if the insurgent jumped to another roof top or went back into the building that he had been occupying. UAS systems and respective operators need to be organic within the elements of mounted and dismounted patrols. Prior to patrols there, would not be a need to establish contact with UAS units not assigned to that platoon within the Brigade foot print except for high altitude fixed wing UAS and armed UAS. This would reduce the time required for patrol preparation. UAS operators would be familiar with the personnel, having been assigned to the unit and operating with that platoon during pre-deployment training and throughout the duration of the deployment.

 

Above: Mosul, Iraq 2005 and Baqubah , Iraq 2008/09

UAS systems organic to each unit can augment individual platoons during routine patrol activities such as Traffic Control Points (TCPs) or Flash Traffic Control Zones (TCZs). Static TCPs provide nothing more than an opportunity for a precision small arms or suicide car bomb attacks. The addition of an internal UAS system may provide earlier warning for dismounted patrols with regard to vehicles that appear outside the normal pattern and daily routine of the populous. Route clearance has been an issue that every Infantry platoon must deal with. Army Engineers are often assigned to execute the duty of route clearance, but during the time that elapsed after the route cleared, IEDs can be emplaced. Infantry platoons usually end up clearing their own routes and that usually consists of patrolling until an IED is spotted or a vehicle is hit with an IED attack. Route clearance for patrols would be easily executed by the platoon conducting the patrol. There would be no need to wait for available aircraft of fixed wing UAS.
Platoon level UAS operators would be Infantrymen and other combat arms that can be trained to operate UAS systems on site and away from the distractions of an office based UAS area. Being on site and operating within a platoon, the operator would have a clear understanding of just how important their imagery would be for ground elements. Failure to gain critical real time information and imagery would affect the UAS operator as much as the other ground elements because the operator is on site, organic with the element, and the overall mission success could rely heavily on the intelligence provided by that UAS. When operating on site the operator is forced to take their portion of any mission more seriously, as he or she is directly involved in the current situation. The duties of a UAS operator do not become a “check the block” daily job. UAS systems with simplified control should allow flight skills to be more easily attained and retention of such skills should be simple to maintain depending on the UAS platform. Light UAS systems or Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs) can be a key element to Platoon and Squad during operations. However, if the system requires extensive cost to procure, line Commanders may still be reluctant to issue the system for fear of losing the “property”. When Commanders are concerned about losing throw away UAS systems, like the Raven, how can any unit expect anything different with more expensive UAS systems? They will follow this same trend. How do we correct this? Two approaches can be reviewed. First; from top to bottom it needs to be made clear to every Commander or Leader that loss of a UAS system during operations should be acceptable if the intelligence gained prior to the UAS failure provided a tactical advantage for ground elements. If this approach does not sit well with the leaders in the upper echelon, then a second approach needs to be attempted; UAS platforms need to be fabricated in a less expensive manner, allowing the platform to be truly “throw away”. Regardless of which approach is applied, one important concern will be brought to light; loss of intelligence intelligence hardware if the system should fall into enemy hands. Considerations for any FLIR or optical system need to be addressed. The worst incident that could develop against our ground elements is an insurgent force with a modified FLIR system salvaged from any UAS wreckage and utilized against Coalition Forces. The above MAV has been dubbed a “back pack” UAS system. From our perspective, it may not a back pack UAS system. Individual Soldiers carry up to 70 pounds of body armor, individual equipment, grenades and basic load of ammunition. That’s without a rucksack or assault pack. This MAV will need to be kept on a vehicle until it is utilized. The weight of the system, however, does not void the importance of its application. It’s testing started in 2005 or 2006 and we still do not have this system at the line across the board. Further, the price tag for this system still may sway leaders from using it to the fullest extent for which it was intended. Similar flat twin power plants can run up to $1000.00 alone. Conceptual view of any battle space can only be gained by UAS or manned aircraft. When our Battalion was in Mosul, there was not an issue with air support. Most of the time. Often the OH-58 crews were tasked out to a point where they could not provide air support for everyone outside the wire. But, when they were available, they were not afraid to get right down “in the weeds” with the rest of us. They flew everywhere that we patrolled. When our Brigade was extended and sent to Baghdad, the air support was scarce. The Apache pilots were uneasy about providing air support in some areas. They would not fly into the areas that we still had to patrol. On one occasion, our Battalion Mortar platoon was on patrol in North Baghdad and one of their Strykers was hit by an Explosive Formed Projectile IED (EFP). Subsequent small arms fire followed the IED attack. Two Apache crews flew over the patrol and kept going, flying out of the area and not providing support for the ground elements that tried to establish communications with the aircraft, but could not. The Aviation unit in that sector had lost one of their Apache crews when their aircraft was shot down. This occurred just prior to the 172 SBCT arriving in Baghdad, augmenting the 4th Infantry Division. Every Soldier in the US Army needs to understand that their lives will be at risk. It’s the nature of our profession. We as Infantrymen need to accept the reality that there will always be a possibility that we could lose our lives during the execution of missions. Likewise, Army Aviators must accept this reality when they support us. Most of them do accept this reality as seen in the OH-58 crews that supported us. But, if one crew fails to fly into our battle space and support us during any incident where we are actively engaged by the enemy, what is the point of having armed rotary winged aircraft? This was not the last time that we had air support available and did not receive it. Perhaps their orders came from higher. This is not “Infantry against Aviation”. It’s one effort. One cannot function as efficiently without the other. The conceptual view of the battle space is critical to units outside the wire most especially when the local populous is rioting. In 2006, our Company was temporarily assigned to Rustamiyah that was controlled by the units occupying FOB Falcon. Falcon had been hit extensively with indirect fire and portions of the ammunition storage area detonated and were destroyed. We assisted with the security of their battle space and conducted patrols while their units made needed repairs to fortifications and the FOB infrastructure. Our Company received a mission to acquire an HVT (High Value Target). While at the residence of the HVT, we discovered that the HVT was not there, but his Father was present. It was decided that we should take the Father for questioning. He was not detained with regard to the utilization of flex cuffs. The family was not cooperative, even after they were assured that the Father would be returned safely later that day or the following day. An unknown cleric announced over the Mosque loud speakers that the American Soldiers had abducted someone and killed a few children, all of which was untrue. A riot developed and a few hundred Local Nationals soon became a few thousand angry Local Nationals. The Apache crews flying in the area only orbited up and down the Tigris River. They did not fly over our respective positions to provide the much needed conceptual view of the battle space. A couple of Air Force fast movers were able to provide flares dropped at a low level. My platoon, one other platoon and an element of MPs were attacked with rocks, debris, and small arms fire. Though not accurate, the small arms fire came from the crowd but, we could not engage because the insurgents were using the angry, unarmed civilians to conceal their positions. We could only engage with non-lethal 12 gauge projectiles for the rock throwing Local Nationals. One of the sniper teams of the 101st Airborne Division were able to engage a few armed insurgents as they over watched the area and took directives from our Company Commander. One newly built Iraqi Police station was damaged, an Iraqi Police technical truck was burned and one Iraqi Policeman was killed.

Rustamiyah, Iraq 2006

Urban terrain provides difficult airspace that UAS systems must operate in at low levels. There are numerous obstacles that UAS systems must maneuver around. Streets and roof tops are often congested with poorly arrayed electrical wiring and satellite antennas. Electrical wiring can often be “web like”. Such obstacles can only be negotiated with VTOL, MAV, or rotorcraft UAS platforms.

City of baqubah, Iraq

Fixed wing UAS systems can only provide low altitude images that are higher than trees and other urban obstacles. Rotorcraft UAS can loiter in stationary positions, peering into narrow alleys and side streets.

Above: Baghdad, Iraq 2006; Mosul, Iraq 2006

The Supporting Industry:
There are a number of companies within the UAS industry that have additional technology and innovation to provide light weight UAS systems for the Infantry Platoon and Squad. Systems that can truly be “throw away”. Of those mentioned in this outline, none have been promised any contract or business. Their information was gathered for informative purposes. Further business inquiries or arrangements will be at the discretion of the respective Army and DOD acquisition entities.

Verticopter: Posted with permission of garrow Aircarft. http://www.verticopter.com/

Posted with permission of Procerus Tech. http://www.procerustech.com

In conclusion, we are a Nation that has been involved in continuous conflict and operations since 2001. Enough time has passed for UAS platforms to be designed, tested, fielded, and implemented down to the lowest level. To date, UAS systems are still not implemented at this level across the Army as a whole. Fear of losing a UAS should never outweigh the tactical advantage over any insurgency or the preservation of life. Cost should never be a consideration when those lives also include those of our Soldiers. Thank you for your time.
SSG David A. Hickman
C CO, 2nd BN, 11th IN REG
Fort Benning, GA 31905

2nd Power Up: Still a few changes to the hub needed

There will be additional changes to the hub over this week-end. My laptop is back on line. I had forgotten that there are a handful of considerations when scaling down or up between small and full scale. Most RC helos have rigid hubs and utilize blade bending to negate disymmetry of lift, so this week end I will be restoring the hub assembly back to an "RC" heli style hub. The mass/weight consideration apply to larger and full scale helos that utilize semi-rigid rotor hubs that teeter. The directional control will still be attained with the mechanical morphing airframe. In this vid clip I state that I will use a 3 bladed rigid, but only if this week-end proves unsuccessful. Lift to weight ratios still good.
Dave

Leadership Effects January 2011

I had some reservations about publishing this paper that I wrote last year for concern that others would think ill of me or that it was an attempt to curry favor. At some point in life you will be confronted with a choice: simply speak your mind regardless of what others may think of you. A few military magazines looked it over. It's my take on leadership from those who were with me state side and Iraq.

LEADERSHIP EFFECTS January 2011
Singular perspective in the mind of any leader will lead him to fail. If uncorrected, it will pass to the others around him and the organization will follow.
Leadership has been defined in a number of ways, but the end result should always be to the benefit of one another, our Soldiers, our military, and our country. Leadership as defined by the Army, uses phrases such as “influencing others” and “providing purpose, direction and motivation”1.
This is still true, but the focus of a leader should be on the effects of his or her leadership. Further, if leaders do not grasp the “human aspect” of leading, how can the organization improve? A number of us may overlook the cause and effect of leadership or the lack there of. Poor leadership or leadership “in part” will not result in just failure alone when the cost paid for the lack of leadership may be another human life.
Leaders at every level should agree that there are two elements that make up any mission-oriented organization, those who follow during mission execution and the select few who lead them. Both are required to achieve any task that places the organization in a tactical advantage over another or to restore security. Failure by either will leave the unit with an incomplete task and lack of sufficient support to accomplish it to the fullest benefit of the organization. From our perspective, the odds will not be in favor of those left to deal with the failure of any leader or subordinate. Most of the failures of subordinates can be traced to their leaders. However, after a leader has implemented every measure of instruction and attention that can be given, a subordinate may still make the wrong choice. He or she is, in fact, just as human as their leaders, and that Soldiers’ free will may not always sway to do what is right. Regardless of the origin of the fault, we as leaders accept responsibility for what our subordinates do right and wrong. This approach to leading helps leaders to focus even further on their subordinates.
The Army is the one institution in which the leader accepts the fault for what their subordinates fail to do. There is no blame. With regard to ethical decisions, there may be an unseen flaw within the subordinate’s moral judgment and character. As leaders, we spend time guiding subordinates both during training and after hours with regard to their personal actions and choices. We remind them that poor choices can lead to adverse actions which will be detrimental to their privileges and rank. How often do we convey to our subordinates the “effects” that their actions can have on others in the organization? How can we as leaders become more efficient in identifying the start of potential issues if the leader is not involved in the personal lives of their subordinates?
Rank has never been a requirement to lead. Rank never compels a Soldier to push himself beyond the limitations of his mind. Determined young Specialists can take charge and lead if they have been under sound leaders during the first part of their tenure in the military. Many of us have seen this. Rank is needed, but it is nothing more than a visual hierarchy that displays a level of authority that an individual leader has been entrusted with, not entitled to, for his or her position of duty. It is visible within the organization at every level. Our character must be balanced with regard to the rank that we hold and the rank that we advance to. At one end of the extreme, if we are not balanced in character, we run the risk of abusing our authority. Worse yet, at the other end, we fail to provide for our subordinates in training or human needs.
Human needs go beyond those that are required to survive in the physical body. All leaders should have learned this as they advanced up through their respective positions of authority, or so we think. Avoiding the mistake of promoting individuals with poor character or weak leadership ability is perhaps the one fact that causes leaders to have reservations about a Soldier being promoted to the rank of Sergeant based on time in service alone. Serious consideration needs to be taken when selecting subordinates for promotions. If we receive a leader who was promoted in this manner, all we can do is take what is there and make it better. In so doing, there are two points that leaders need to keep in mind when assessing incoming leaders who will either be our subordinates leaders, peers and Senior Leaders. First, the leader has no insight as to the methods of their training and mentorship. Poor leaders create more poor leaders, and bad habits carry from one to another. Every leader has faults and may fall short in some aspect of his duties, but it’s the leaders who choose to address these issues who become leaders of genuine character and look beyond “self” seeking to improve. Second, even if a leader has been instructed in the requirements of basic human needs, it is still not evidence that this leader is in practice of executing the correct actions of leadership.
The leader development process for subordinate leaders and Soldiers is not to be taken with a “half-hearted” approach. One Army perspective states: “During this leader development process, the responsibility for a leader’s complete development is mutually shared by the leaders of the Army Education System, Commanders, and Leaders in the field, and the leaders themselves”2.
Instructors in the Army Education System are in place to develop “line leaders” to better the organization. One unavoidable fact is that instructors are only with their respective student leaders for the duration of the developmental course. Course curriculum “highlights” the “job aspect” of their responsibilities and many leaders end up getting pushed through the course, keeping to the weekly schedule so long as all attendees receive passing scores on their exams. Instructors cannot fully evaluate leaders with regard to their ability to grasp and understand the “human considerations” in leading and developing their subordinate leaders and subordinates. Leaders on the line spend a good deal of their time involved daily with their Soldiers, but if the line leaders did not have the proper mentorship during their development, they will not be “in tune” with the human side of subordinate development. Many leaders in the Infantry often face the “taboo” designation as being a “Joe Lover” when other leaders witness the care for the well-being of subordinates. I agree that there needs to be a balance, but all leaders need to be attentive to the emotional and other human needs of their Soldiers. Neglect or failure to provide opportunity to resolve issues affecting emotional needs will allow doubt to enter the minds of subordinates causing instability in their emotional well being. Issues left undone will foster an unfocused mind during the execution of missions. A subordinate who is not focused on the mission will prove to be detrimental to himself and those around him, which can result in
the loss of life. The efforts of an unfocused Soldier provide nothing more than a void in security. He or she is of no use to the organization in their present state.
Leadership has focused mostly on compelling our subordinates to execute missions that affect those within the organization at every level as well as the host nation in which the organization operates. This is still both true and necessary for achieving the mission as set forth by the intent of any Commander. With regard to our history of leadership, mission accomplishment was a top priority regardless of the effects in human costs and subordinate needs. Today we recognize that care for the human side of our Soldiers is a fundamental requirement for the operation of a successful organization. It should never be to a point where subordinates become soft or fall short in standards, but there needs to be a balance between the two. Mission accomplishment is still top priority, but we cannot ignore the human side.
On today’s front, leadership often involves directing and continually encouraging subordinates to execute tasks that would normally be against any human will if given a choice because it places them in danger. For this reason, Soldiers and Leaders need to understand that being a Soldier is not just a “job” and should never be considered just a career. In truth, it is a profession that requires a great deal of personal conviction. We
chose our profession and we also chose to lead well, in part or not at all. Whatever measure of effort we put into our leadership, it will be visible through our actions and the performance of our subordinates. Leading Soldiers will always have results and consequences. Choices in leadership will always have effects. Good or bad. How do we accomplish the task of leading subordinates in the execution of missions that could result in the loss of life? Further, how can we grasp the reality of both our will and that of our Soldiers to strive for mission success during which it’s execution we’re acutely aware that it could be our lives that are lost? We as leaders must also be prepared to both witness and deal with the loss of those that we serve with as leaders and those with whom we lead. We’ll also deal with the emotional effects of our remaining subordinates that will be brought on by the death of a peer. I want to pose two questions for thought and a genuine inward reflection for all of us as leaders. This is the only time that “self” needs to come first; when assessing one’s character as a leader. What if that loss of life was due to the failure on our part to lead effectively? Do you really think Soldiers will be unaware of our part in this failure? This is reason for absolute personal conviction within every Soldier. Most especially those in the ranks of the Infantry and Combat Arms, but all Soldiers facing adversity and genuine risk of death fit this category. With regard to personal conviction, if Soldiers and Leaders do not have within themselves a sense of duty and belonging to each other, their unit and Nation, they do not possess genuine personal conviction. Conviction and belief in the preservation of the well being of our subordinates and one another are the traits of selfless service. These traits are present within the character of only a few. Most new Soldiers use the military as a “test bed” for figuring out their lives and what they want. Leaders have the responsibility to instruct their Soldiers on the importance of selfless service. Further, while it’s ok for them to figure out their lives in the Army, leaders must help them grasp the reality that the effects of their choices have much more “gravity” when the organization as a whole must deal with the outcome. All Soldiers must understand that our purpose is greater than ourselves and we must implement sound judgment in every decision that we make both on and off duty. This personal conviction motivates these Soldiers and Leaders to give of themselves. When Soldiers see their peers wounded and regrettably at times their death, it will cause them to appeal in action on behalf of those around them that have fallen. The decision to step forward and take this action is the ultimate form of selfless service. This kind of selfless service happens often within our ranks. Our appreciation to one another for such actions is evident, but seen only by those who endured with us.
In one previous unit, our Battalion Commander made it clear that there must be a complete “buy in” in the unit mission and the Commander’s intent for that unit to succeed. Perhaps this instruction came from higher. I agree if the cause is just and there is no violation of moral character or ethics during mission execution. This applies to both tasks within the organization or any act carried out among the populous of the host country. In the countries we operate, there will be those of a mindset that follow extremist beliefs that justify the deaths of their own people. This will make it difficult for Soldiers to execute a Commander’s intent without individuals of this mind set feeling as if the Americans are violating their morals and ethics. Their beliefs are not only contrary to good civil order, but also the entitlement of every human being to dwell peacefully. Our efforts are generally an “effect” of good leadership during the execution of operations that preserve the human entitlement of peace. Peace that at times cannot exist without selfless service and sacrifice for those who are unaware what is given for them. It is a basic human need. When viewed from the perspective of humanity, freedom can no longer be restricted within the boundaries of our country.
Each and every one of us should reflect inward and ask ourselves, “Am I here just for a career or just to be a Soldier and Leader?” If the answer is “just a career” you have no purpose within the ranks of the Infantry or any branch of the Military service. If a Leader or Soldier is only interested in a career alone or the pay, their first thought will be for “self” rather than “others”. During training and actual missions, the benefit of others and the organization will not be first in their minds. If leaders think this way, what will be the outcome of their decisions? Soldiers and Leaders of this character will never be willing to give of themselves or only give enough if there is some personal gain to be attained. Such gains could be the possibility for advancement in rank or to produce a “false perception” of one’s character in an effort to look good in the presence of superiors and not living sound leadership daily.
True leadership serves a higher purpose and benefits those above and below us. Leaders focused on “self” do not see the results of the implementation of good leadership. The end-state is the efficient execution of any task. Tasks or missions executed more efficiently will result in less chance of fratricide and the unintentional killing or wounding of civilians. All of which will affect the organization at every level. Genuine leadership is often thankless and any leader not driven by a “career” must understand that the best leadership often goes unseen, even by those that they lead. Subordinates are usually unaware of the sacrifices that leaders make on their behalf. Sacrifice of time, sleep or food. The list can go on. I am comfortable with this, because the daily tasks that need to be carried out are done so efficiently. This creates an environment with less stress. The “machine” runs smoothly. An atmosphere with less stress on subordinates keeps their minds clear and focused when it comes time to execute missions that have a high level of stress and personal threat. The same holds true for tending to the needs of Soldiers with regard to spiritual and emotional needs. For this reason, it’s necessary for leaders to be involved in the lives of their subordinates. Even simply stopping by the barracks during the week-end for a brief check on their Soldiers is important. At the time the subordinate may feel as if their leader is intruding, but usually it is appreciated even if the subordinate never expresses it. Caring for the well-being of subordinates does not stop after the unit gets back from the field, refit is complete, and everyone is on their way after the safety brief. A subordinate’s problems become the problems of their leaders all the way up through the Chain of Command and NCO Support Channel. Don’t ignore it or expect that the Soldier knows how to best deal with the issue. When deployed, if a subordinate learns that they have lost their spouse either to death or even if it’s a fidelity issue, their mind will not be clear during missions. It would be wise to leave this Soldier off of a few patrols in conjunction with seeing the Chaplin and other elements within the military that are present to help service men and women deal with problems. Leadership is never executed for the recognition of “self” by higher leaders. Leadership is any action on my part to train and move my subordinates, conveying to them that this action must be executed for a greater good that affects their lives as well as others. It is more important than ourselves, and requires our genuine attention if it is to be successful. If we fail those who follow us may fail, leaving the task undone. Every action we perform and every decision we make as leaders will have an effect on someone. This is why knowing the “definition” of leadership is not leadership. Our actions, decisions and our example are what “cause” the desired “effects” needed for a successful organization.
Our country was founded on an unwavering belief in God and self-sacrifice for the whole rather than “self”. Our history reflects that we have a great nation, so I am inclined to believe that their belief in God and selfless actions were just. Regardless of belief in faith, race or ethnicity, leadership is required to succeed. Human needs are the same for all. Self-sacrifice will be demanded of any nation that expects to prosper and preserve the freedoms of its populous or the freedom of other nations who cannot stand for themselves against an oppressor that deprives them of such basic human entitlements. Leaders should never forget that even though his or her selfless service goes unseen, there is always someone looking for our faults as leaders. It will either be someone that only has the intention to point out our faults simply to correct and develop us or it very well may be a leader who is focused on “self” and looks for fault only for the gratification of holding their authority over you. Regardless of which, if we maintain our character and hold ourselves responsible for our duties, they will find very little to point out. But, this requires genuine leadership, daily selfless actions and the ability to look inwardly at our own character. When there is fault, do not let pride prevent the correction of your actions and character. If we are not cautious, we as leaders can become more concerned about how we look with regard to our Officer Evaluation Reports (OER) and Non-Commissioned Officer Evaluation Reports (NCOER) rather than taking care of our subordinates and the greater good of the organization. If we do not conduct an occasional “self check”, a leader can develop a “power trip” or an attitude of “self” rather than executing good leadership. Subordinate leaders and Soldiers will see through it as well. This is often seen in a few newly promoted leaders advancing to a higher level of responsibility. Leaders should always be humble enough to remind themselves that the Army is still a “human organization”.
That being said, we as leaders can make mistakes. We must never let anything prevent us from addressing our short comings. We all must understand that no matter how high in the Chain of Command or NCO Support Channel we advance to, we can still learn more, improve and develop ourselves. The truth is never tasteful when it is not in our favor. One simple example is choosing the “easy wrong” over the “hard right” or being guilty of choosing “self” over the benefit of those around us. It happens more than we may think. It is still a truth that will eventually be seen, revealing our intent. We need to correct whatever prevents the truth from being in our favor. The majority of Leaders are of genuine character, but being human it’s always good to check our own character, giving our “moral compass” a quick shake to be certain that we’re on the right path regarding our leadership and that “self” comes last. The Seven Army Values are a good corner stone if we as Soldiers and Leaders practice the values rather than just committing them to memory. If all Soldiers and Leaders choose to serve others rather than “self”, the organization as a whole will be in good care. The choice of “self” will never need to be addressed because your peers and leaders will see to your well being and you theirs.
SSG David Allen Hickman
C CO, 2nd BN, 11th IN RGT

HMI Injury Risk and SMART/Adaptive Control

There are a number considerations that need to be addressed with regard to possible injury that could result from the poor design of human-machine interface airframes. Mechanical  design is critical not only for the sound integrity of any mechanical frame, but also critical when considering the mechanical span of motion in relation to the human span of motion. With regard to human machine interface, the ideal human control axiom is to have both machine and human ranges of motion function together at equal moments.
Any failure in the mechanical range of motion can cause the improper or over extension in the human span of motion and result in injury or prove fatal to the pilot. Problems that develop in ground based machines are affected by the forces of physics and can result in injury and mechanical failure. The same problems in an HMI airframe are also affected by physics in the same manner, but the issues are compounded because the HMI airframe is at altitude. Any injury, even minor, can prevent pilot recovery control input, resulting in fatal descent of the aircraft.

The Human Interface Rotor System is only a “motion” physical-interface system in its current configuration. The weight of the pilot is in balance with the rest of the upper airframe aft and distributed between the two airframes. The goal is to combine haptic and physical interface with a computer system that assists with pilot control. The HIR rotor system can then become an intelligent control system. The informational system can be programmed  to assist pilot input in the form of servo, hydraulic or pneumatic manipulation of control linkages. Regardless of the control measures used, injury may still result if poor design is implemented during fabrication. The pilot moves with the rotor system. There is interaction between the pilot and the two airframes that move with and around the pilot. Consideration should be given to points between the two airframes that could bind any part of the body between moving portions causing injury.

HMI RISKS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
- Risk: Poor ergonomic design with regard to spans of motion between both machine and human extremities. This may cause joint over extension and muscular / tendon strains and tears.
Proposed Solution: static stops between moving components of machine parts and machine frames that will prevent over extension of machine spans of motion and in turn  prevent over extension in human ranges of motion.
- Risk: Flight control over correction or failing to manipulate controls due to a delay in “response to motion” during mechanical morphing of the airframe when at altitude. The complexity of learning the skills of correct responses during HMI operation in conjunction with piloting skills may cause mental strain. How will the natural human response affect the airframe and flight characteristics? Will the pilot be more prone to human error? Mastering piloting skills can cause enough strain. Will the sensation that the pilot feels, as he/she moves slightly with the rotor system, cause over correction of flight control inputs or hesitation of needed reflexes for proper control responses,…. .i.e. reacting too little or not at all? Pilots are familiar with what they feel when flying or learning to fly helicopters with static airframes. The unusual feeling that may be associated with HMI mechanical morphing of airframes in conjunction with all that physics impart to the body during flight may be more than the human mind can process and react to in a timely manner for safe flight. Simulation and testing will tell.
- Proposed Solution: Aside from a great deal of testing, a different approach to informational software for flight simulation will be required. Perhaps even a complete paradigm shift. Any design for a simulator will need to be from the ground up for both mechanical hardware and informational control software. Simulator airframes must function in the exact same manner as the intended flying prototype, to include the moving pilot seat. Traditional helicopter simulators will not provide valid training platforms because it is nothing more than a “box“ on a gimbal utilizing hydraulics and pneumatics to control the “box attitude“ to simulate flight.
Flight controls need to be designed and tested to function correctly to be certain that there are no unwanted control changes during mechanical morphing. With regard to the HIR rotor system, the collective pitch stick is positioned at 40 to 45 degrees rather than vertical. This should prevent unwanted collective pitch change as the upper airframe tilts forward/aft, but it has not been tested. Fly-by-wire may need to be incorporated.
* The end state should be a rotorcraft that utilizes a rotor system and airframe that together form  an intelligent mechanical system. It will combine physical-haptic interface and assisted control in the form of an informational system that predicts human response and assists, but does not take total control. One key goal would be detect unwanted human response in flight controls due to pilot error or a response due to a medical emergency that develops in the health of the pilot. Similar to a form of “guided auto pilot”. Step outside the box for a bit and view it as if you were a child and learning to ride a bicycle again. One of our parents would run along behind us with one hand on the bicycle seat “assisting” or applying lateral “input” to keep us up right in the desired position for riding a bicycle until we internalize the balance required to master it. Rather than a bicycle, we have a helicopter. Instead of one of our parents, we have an informational system programmed to “keep one hand on the seat” and assist when needed to keep the aircraft in the most optimal flight configuration.
A rotorcraft that incorporates this type of Human Adaptive Mechatronics could then be a more efficient aircraft.
-Risk: High Force Input. There are concerns about the physics involved with rotorcraft and the forces that will affect any airframe, let alone an HMI airframe. Will the forces affecting the helicopter develop moments requiring high force control input which could also cause injury or undue strain on the human body as well as the control linkages? This concern is associated with smaller helicopters, but may affect larger aircraft as well.
-Proposed Solution:  With larger rotorcraft, hydraulic assisted control linkages are standard. For smaller rotorcraft the  use of hydraulics has not been an option until recently. Now there is a small self contained hydraulic unit that is light weight. It contains a small internal electric hydraulic pump incased within the cylinder.

Armed UAS/UAV Targeting "AI Singularity" (Not the Sci-FiVersion)

In 2010, an autonomous rotorcraft UAS left it’s programmed course and flew into restricted airspace over Washington DC. The operator lost contact or the UAS system lost the GPS signal. There are a number of individuals both in the realm of conspiracy theorists and those of rational science, who are concerned about AI Singularity or informational, mechanical, and SMART systems becoming self-aware.
Though mechanically inclined, I am not by any means an expert in the field of computers or that of mechanics. That being said, I could be completely wrong in my methodology and thinking with regard to how I ponder this subject. I will, however, convey my thoughts on why it is important to keep a human “in the loop” with regard to any SMART system, Human Machine Interface (HMI) or Human Adaptive Mechatronic(HAM) systems. In today’s informational age, there are a number of conspiracy theory and dooms day forums in which AI Singularity is a hot topic. Ignorance plays a part in a number, but not all of these perspectives from people giving their “2 cents“. The rapid pace at which technology is progressing imparts fear to people of whom many are not informed. However, there have been incidents after which the end result could have been worse which questions in favor of the plausibility of AI singularity.
I do not believe that informational/mechanical systems will become “self-aware” to a degree that people have seen in the Hollywood pictures or urban legends. I believe that AI/SMART systems may act or react in an adverse manner, but it would be the result of segments of informational code entered incorrectly into the system, retrieval of such incorrect code producing unwanted actions, or failure of the system to differentiate between groups of code. Let’s say, for example, the code differences between actual targets and that of friendly non-combatant. How will the system associate segments of hostile and friendly code to local nationals in fields of combat or even the populous of America when training with such systems is conducted? This is the exact reason that keeping a human in the loop is required. A human mind can discern aggressive body language. We think in a rational manner while taking into consideration risk mitigation and collateral damage prior to reacting to a hostile threat. Or as Soldiers, we can simply change our posture to address the first signs of a perceived hostile intent. Perhaps our change to this more aggressive posture will be enough to deter an individual from escalating from the suspicion of hostile intent to a hostile act. This works well for human face to face, but not always and certainly not with autonomous UAS. With UAS it’s one sided. The upper hand, with regard to target discrimination, is in the favor of the UAS operator who is the “human in the loop”. That being said, why would the decision of life and death or the “upper hand” be left to  an autonomous computer system? An aggressive posture for the UAS is merely its presence. A combatant may choose to transition from hostile intent to out right hostile act. After all, they know that the aircraft is unmanned and has limitations. Insurgents are smart enough to stay out of the line of sight of the UAS optics in low altitude or act like the local populous and “blend in“. In Iraq, the insurgents were smart enough to step inside a building when they heard the power plant of a UAS and waited until it completed it’s pass before continuing with their activities.
 Autonomous systems only retrieve and associate informational code to a target or what “it” thinks to be a target based on a summation of information entered into the system prior to mission execution. For a UAS to be truly autonomous, the informational code is entered into and associated for the UAS targeting system. Even if the system can “learn“, there must be a starting point or foundation of code that must be entered into the system. In turn, said code is retrieved and associated by the system to a hostile target and responds accordingly which is another grouping of code for the correct response. The issue is what if the system associates hostile code to the motion of a raised hand or perhaps an object in a raised hand? How then will the system differ between a man with a weapon and a man with a shovel who only intends to carry out his trade of farming? How will the system prevent the association of hostile code to US ground forces with their respective weapons systems? To date, armed UAS aircraft are controlled by human pilots, but there is a hope and an effort for UAS to be completely autonomous. Programs can be entered into a UAS system and the UAS will take off on “it’s” own and execute that mission. Autonomous systems that can learn do so through the recording of video, thermal, and topographical data from “it’s” surroundings and “learn” as it associates and categorizes the information attained. Even from what it learns it can predict an outcome based on the data it has attained and retrieves. Still yet, what if the system is wrong? That is what concerns many people. Keeping a human in the loop will help prevent sets of circumstances that are not hostile from being treated as hostile when utilizing autonomous UAS targeting systems. The human mind thinks not only with the consideration of risk mitigation and collateral damage, but a human can also reason, taking into account the social effects that their actions may have when acting or reacting to hostile intent or threat. As a result of our reasoning, we have a larger conceptual view of the possible effects caused by our actions and we can adjust our response with measured force and lethality (killing only the enemy and not civilians). But in all conflicts there will be collateral damage both in property and loss in life.  Autonomous UAS are given a mission through a program and guided by satellites, but the question still remains; what if the UAS, for what ever reason, flies off course and gets it wrong? It’s occurred before, but thus far I have never heard of an incident during which people were harmed by autonomous UAS systems. Since it’s possible for a UAS to have “glitches” with it’s navigational GPS, can there be chance for the UAS to experience a malfunction with the GPS system specifically for targeting? With human intellect, there are no codes to differ between hostile and friendly except that which we gather from our environment when we feel threatened. It’s instinctive “fight or flight” reactions. We simply know when we either see or even sense an impending threat. We know our decisions need to be addressed with a moral approach with regard to what is right and wrong. Consideration is given to human dignity and human rights. Entitlements to exist in peace. There can be no informational code for this. What we associate as peaceful existence, a SMART system only sees as a different grouping of code apart from the codes associated to hostile targets. There is no way for the system to associate code for acts of peace and normal routine existence. The system does not reason why routine acts are important or key to good social order. The understanding for the need and preservation of social order is an important state of existence that only the human mind can reason with and make the correct choices for in order to maintain a peaceful existence. Thus the utilization of armed UAS and keeping a “human in the loop” is pragmatic. A safe and predictable union of the human mind and our informational/mechanical devices. At least when compared to the theory regarding the outcome should AI singularity become reality in conjunction with armed UAS not being coupled with a human awareness. The implementation of lethal instruments of war without the human mind will not lead to any form of peaceful social order. Perhaps nothing would happen. But, what if we’re wrong? The choice of life and death given to a SMART system removes the human desire to prevent war even if only in one incident. The only chance to prevent any unwanted act that only humans will regret is gone and yet we no longer have control of for a period of time because the choice was made to have a completely autonomous armed UAS. It must be dealt with outside the autonomous system.
 Like all other Soldiers, I’m against war, but I also recognize that war is necessary to preserve peace and good social order. The benefits and human qualities of life that are taken by terrorists or any other armed enemy. That being said, we should always keep our skills to wage war very honed and quick to utilize to prevent total social break down. This includes our instruments of war, but a human mind should always be coupled with any weapon system. Many of you may disagree about my thoughts on war. That it should never happen, but the problem is that it does happen and it’s often unavoidable as there are two sides to a human mind. That which is good and that which takes pleasure in the demise of others. Pray to God that the instruments to wage war stay in the hands of those who protect the peaceful existence of our nation and those of our allies. At least pray that we always have the bigger stick. That includes technology.
D.A. Hickman

Kinematics with respect to the HIR Airframe and CG "Flex"(My Theory)

KINESTHETIC MECHANICS
 PHYSICS & GEOMETRY MATHEMATICS
AFFECTING GIMBALED AIRFRAMES
Kinesthetic Mechanics: The interaction of the human body with any mechanical device that may be controlled by the movement of the extremities and/or body weight in order to attain a desired result or change in the device attitude or configuration. Such results may be any range of motion, mechanical frame attitude control or the movement of a prescribed load or cargo from one point to another. An exoskeleton mechanical device may be rigid or move with the body, combining kinesthetics in an exoskeleton mechanical frame to control it’s attitude, function or range of motion. Control may be facilitated by computer aided sensory devices, hydraulics or pneumatics. How can it be applied in the aerospace industry? Where does practical application end & “novelty” begin?
Can we question if there is a correlation between the mathematics of geometry & all of the forces of physics which have an affect on any airframe? Does the end result of a man made mathematical change, cause an equal change in any part of physics? Perhaps one can consider this to be true when thinking “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Can all of these effects of physics interacting with the mathematics of geometry be controlled at equal moments to attain a positive result in transitional flight?
Picture your childhood see-saw. It is nothing more than a lever centered on a fulcrum. The center of gravity of the two loads is balanced & in line or just below the board or for the sake of Geometry, we’ll call it the “horizontal lever reference line“. It can be affected by the shifting of weight and/or applied force to the balanced load. Force is applied at one end resulting in the far end moving in the opposite direction at equal distance because the applied force is redirected through the centered fulcrum to the opposite end of the lever. Now apply this mental picture to the airframe of a helicopter. Move the fulcrum higher above the “horizontal lever reference line” giving it a much lower center of gravity with regard to weight distribution at both ends of our “airframe lever”. This gives us more stability. In our case it is the upper airframe w/ the pilot at one end and the power plant, electronics, etc.  at the other. During fabrication, portions of the helicopter may be moved around before being permanently fastened together to insure balance. This is why we do mockups. Fuel cells may be placed under the CG like that of the “saddle” fuel cells on a Bell 47G which solves the positioning of fuel on the airframe with regard to the CG. Fuel is burned off and the airframe becomes lighter. The fulcrum is the lower airframe with a gimbal joint or spherical bearing. The upper airframe “lever” is attached at more than one point to the lower airframe “fulcrum” to facilitate rigid control of the upper airframe “lever“. Now add an additional longitudinal lever near the center of gravity. Applied force (pilot input) will manipulate our horizontal airframe “lever“ from the center of the balanced load via the longitudinal lever. Now set the entire assembly within an imaginary cone or pyramid. The point of the cone/pyramid will be the location of the gimbal fulcrum and the longitudinal lever will extend down through the center. The area within the cone will be the only area in which the CG can be manipulated.

Now let’s talk about traditional weight shifting & CG manipulation concepts in helicopters. Traditional CG/weight shifting manipulates the CG within a static airframe or tilting the mast from a point on a static airframe. All of the forces act accordingly, some being negative. The CG is shifted to another portion of the airframe, even in small amounts, outside the “perfect balance of all forces” acting on that aircrafts’ CG/balance. Lift, thrust and all of these forces act on any airframe…….gyroscopic precession whatever, all must be taken into account. Vibrations can result…..the usual “for every action there is an equal & opposite reaction”. So, how do we work with these forces so that the end-state of lift & transitional flight are efficient? Lets go back to the basics of Geometry again. I hope we all can agree that the mathematics of geometry are in perfect harmony with all of the forces of physics. Look at anything in nature. The forming of a crystal for example…..perfect geometry. Why should physics be different than anything else in nature? If both are equal then all is well and in balance. We can change it, but we must deal with the “opposite reaction”. If we change it equally, in theory, the opposite reaction should be positive provided that the applied force is calculated & flight control inputs are made & limited accordingly. Precise inputs are determined through testing. One must be careful never to add too much “applied force” which can result in over correction. The applied force being greater than the positive & equal balance of forces affecting the center of gravity/weight configuration of the aircraft can cause negative “opposite reactions”. Unwanted or even violent vibrations at minimum can occur and perhaps cause a moment during which other negative forces may surface affecting your airframe adversely such as fastener or material degradation. Back to the see saw, balance of two loads w/ force applied, but with a twist. Instead of shifting the weight or CG to attain the desired affect, let us use the “for every action there is an equal & opposite reaction”  to our advantage. Of course this methodology is theoretical because we understand that there are some things in physics we cannot control. The affects of some forces are just too great. Let us not shift the CG in mast orientation form alone or simply move any given load or a portion of that load in linear fashion to affect the CG. Applied force can be introduced to  tilt or “flex” the CG within a given area (imaginary cone/pyramid) and the necessary levers & fulcrums to support movement within this area. Further, the airframe will also change equally every time the CG changes. Both move together as a result of equal moments of applied force. The CG is manipulated at the lower end of the longitudinal lever which hangs down through our imaginary pyramid or cone.  The rotor disc at the higher end of the longitudinal lever moves in calculated shorter spans of movement as opposed to the lower end of the longitudinal lever where applied force (pilot input) is introduced. Utilizing two airframes, leaving the rotor system completely within one of the frames gimbaled to the other, results in the applied force  tilting of the rotor disc/mast as well as the center of gravity in equal amounts. More stability in the dimension of “UP” is always a benefit the higher we maneuver the aircraft in altitude. The longitudinal lever receives applied force which is transmitted through the fulcrum and results in force or movement in the opposite direction than where the applied force was introduced. This force “result” tilts the upper airframe & rotor disc yet with a smaller span of motion at the upper end of the longitudinal lever near the fulcrum to vector the thrust. This also prevents over correcting. The lower end of the longitudinal lever is where the weight and center of gravity are most stable. It is also the area in which the lever has the most area to move, flexing the CG within the largest area of our imaginary cone. For example, applied force (pilot input) tilts or flexes the CG -2 degrees aft causing the horizontal upper airframe to tilt forward and the rotor disc also moves in like manner +2 degrees forward. This morphing affect also places the airframe into the most optimal configuration to hold the balance of forces in physics within the area of the imaginary cone. Changes are made in equal increments in the airframe, center of gravity & rotor disc attitude. Of course this is just a theory of mine. We’ll see if it works.

D. Hickman

Aluminum Mock Up

A  little about the HIR Airframe:

The Human Interface Rotor System is only a “motion and balance” physical-interface system in its current configuration. The weight of the pilot is in balance with the rest of the upper airframe aft and distributed between the two airframes. The goal is to combine haptic and physical interface with a computer system that assists with pilot control, but keeping a human in the "loop". The HIR rotor system can then become a platform with an intelligent control system. Our Japanese counter parts are already working with HMI and HAM, but I have not seen it applied to rotorcraft as of yet. It may still already exist.
The HIR airframe uses "human interface" in conjunction with an offset axis gimbal joint to "morph" the airframe thereby tilting the rotor disc for directional control. This slightly "flexes" the center of gravity. Charles Seibel was first to design a helicopter with human interface control. The GEN H4 uses a gimbal, yet it is a fixed pitch coaxial design. The HIR system does not have any linear shift in weight / CG. Patent App. # US 12,462,595. Below first crude sketches in 2005.

Delta 3 flapping axis

I changed the rotor hub to a Delata 3 flapping axis from a 90 degree axis.

Dave